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Defining the "Essence of the Business": An Analysis
of Title VII's Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls
Jillian B. Bermant
Consider the following scenario: David, a male nurse, responds to
a job advertisement for a nurse in the labor unit of a hospital. When
he submits his application, David is told that the position is open only
to female nurses, in order to protect the privacy interests of the partu-
rient women.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from dis-
criminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's ... sex."' Intentional discrimination based on sex is permissi-
ble, however, for jobs in which sex is a "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation ('BFOQ') reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise."2 The BFOQ is an affirmative de-
fense that is available to employers who can show that "the essence of
[their] business operation would be undermined by not hiring mem-
bers of one sex exclusively.
3
This Comment focuses specifically on the BFOQ commonly
known as the "privacy BFOQ" as it relates to the health care industry.
4
The privacy BFOQ applies to sex-based employment policies that
employers claim are necessary to protect the privacy interests of their
patients, clients, or customers. For example, one court has held that a
hospital may refuse to hire men to work as nurses in the labor and de-
t B.S. 1997, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-532 §§ 701-06, 78 Stat 241, 255
(1964), codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2 Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(1). The employer bears the burden
of proof for this affirmative defense. See Diaz v Pan American World Airvays Inc, 442 F2d 385,
388-89 (5th Cir 1971).
3 Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 323 (1977), quoting Diaz, 442 F2d at 388. There are
various justifications for the BFOQ exception to Title VII. See EEOC Guideline on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(2) (1984) (ensuring authentic performances by actors
and actresses); Torres v Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 859 F2d 1523,1530
(7th Cir 1988) (furthering the rehabilitation of female prisoners); Chambers v Omaha Girls Club,
Inc, 834 F2d 697,702 (8th Cir 1987) (preserving the role model status of a Girls Club staff mem-
ber); Levin v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 730 F2d 994,997 (5th Cir 1984) (protecting the physical safety
and security of airline passengers). This Comment focuses on the BFOQ justified as protecting
the privacy of third parties. See notes 6-11.
4 It is also referred to as the "BFOQ based on privacy."
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livery units without violating Title VII, because female patients would
not feel comfortable with male nurses.!
The patients' privacy interests do not relate to an employee's
physical ability to do the job.6 Courts have accepted a privacy BFOQ
most frequently where the job in question requires the employee to
view a patient's naked body. Existing law permits sex-based employ-
7
ment policies with respect to nurses, nurses' aides," janitors, child care
specialists at psychiatric hospitals, '° and prison guards' because these
jobs sometimes require employees to view the naked bodies of pa-
tients or inmates.n
Even though Congress provided the statutory BFOQ defense in
order to permit some sex-based employment policies, the Supreme
Court has stated that it was "meant to be an extremely narrow excep-
tion to the general prohibition of discrimination.' '3 The Court recently
reaffirmed the limited scope of the exception in International Union,
UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc. In practice, however, the privacy
BFOQ has been interpreted broadly in the health care industry. The
burden for establishing this BFOQ has not been difficult for employ-
ers to satisfy, and courts have often permitted the defense where the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has urged
otherwise.'-
5 See Backus v Baptist Medical Center, 510 F Supp 1191,1194-95 (E D Ark 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 671 F2d 1100,1102-03 (8th Cir 1982).
6 See Fesel v Masonic Home of Delaware Inc, 447 F Supp 1346,1354 (D Del 1978) (cita-
tions omitted) (finding that female sex was a BFOQ for the position of nurse's aide at a residen-
tial retirement home, even though male aides were physically capable of performing the job du-
ties, based on evidence that female guests objected to treatment by male nurses), affd, 591 F2d
1334 (3d Cir 1979).
7 See Backus, 510 F Supp at 1194-95.
8 See Jones v Hinds General Hospital, 666 F Supp 933, 936-37 (S D Miss 1987) (holding
that the hospital established that male sex was a BFOQ for hospital orderlies in order to pre-
serve the privacy interests of male patients).
9 See Brooks v ACF Industries, Inc, 537 F Supp 1122,1133 (S D W Va 1982) (holding that
male sex was a BFOQ for employment as a janitor where janitorial duties included cleaning
men's bathhouses).
10 See Healey v Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, 78 F3d 128,133-34 (3d Cir 1996) (permit-
ting a privacy-based BFOQ for child care specialists at a psychiatric hospital where the special-
ist's duties include accompanying children to the bathroom and occasionally bathing them).
11 See Robino v Iranon, 145 F3d 1109,1110-11 (9th Cir 1998) (holding that female sex con-
stituted a BFOQ for six of forty-one corrections officer positions at a women's prison).
12 For example, prison guards sometimes must conduct body cavity searches of inmates,
and some employers argue that guards who perform this duty must be the same sex as the pris-
oner. See Torres, 859 F2d at 1525.
13 Dothard, 433 US at 334. See also 29 CFR § 1604.2(a) (describing the EEOC's belief that
exceptions "should be interpreted narrowly").
14 499 US 187,201 (1991) (holding that male sex was not a BFOQ for jobs involving expo-
sure to lead at a battery manufacturing plant where protecting potential fetuses from lead expo-
sure did not constitute the essence of the business).
15 See discussion in Part I.C2.
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The privacy BFOQ, which currently may prevent male nurses
from obtaining jobs because of their sex, may also result in the denial
of salaried jobs to male physicians, particularly obstetricians and gyne-
cologists ("OB-GYNs")."6 If so, these physicians, an increasing number
of whom are salaried employees protected by Title VII, may begin to
file sex discrimination lawsuits.
1 7
This Comment argues that the current test courts use to deter-
mine whether sex is a privacy BFOQ in the health care industry is too
broad and therefore is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of Title VII in Johnson Controls. In addition, while guide-
lines promulgated by the EEOC do not have the binding force of
precedent, and decisions that do not conform to EEOC guidelines are
not necessarily invalid, courts have permitted the privacy BFOQ
16 The application of the privacy BFOQ to obstetricians and gynecologists is foreseeable
for three reasons: (1) The influx of "employee" doctors protected under Title VII. See note 17.
(2) The increasing percentage of obstetricians and gynecologists who are female. See Leigh Page,
Will Women Become the New OB-GYN Majority?, 34 Am Med News No 46, 15 (Dec 9, 1991)
(reporting that while women were still a minority among OB-GYN residents overall, they make
up 54 percent of first-year residents). See also Phil Galewitz, Women Doctors: How Critical is
Gender When Ob/Gyn Care is the Issue?, Harrisburg Patriot and Evening News G1 (Mar 28,
1993) (reporting that by the turn of the century, there will be 40,000 physicians in the OB-GYN
specialty, 28 percent of whom will be women). (3) The increasing preference by women for fe-
male doctors, and specifically for female obstetricians and gynecologists. For studies indicating
that women increasingly prefer female obstetricians and gynecologists, see Genevieve Buck,
Mirror Images: More Patients Are Looking For Doctors Who Reflect Their Concerns, Chi Trib Cl
(June 12, 1994); and American Health Line, 6 Am Political Network No 9 (June 24, 1999). The
growing preference for female OB-GYNs is likely to be bolstered by the fact that some male
doctors actively urge women to seek obstetric and gynecological care from female doctors. See
John M. Smith, Women and Doctors: A Physician's Explosive Account of Women's Medical
Treatment-and Mistreatment-in America Today and What You Can Do About It 25-29 (Atian-
tic Monthly 1992). Smith, a Colorado physician, argues that men should have no role in manag-
ing pregnancy and childbirth or treating the female sexual organs.
17 The protection afforded to physicians under Title VII is relatively new. Traditionally,
doctors have not been covered by Title VII because they have not been employees, but have ei-
ther owned their own practices, formed partnerships with other doctors, or contracted out their
services to hospitals. See Erin E. Flaharty, Dazed & Confused- The Uncertain State of the Law
Regarding Whether Hospitals' Denial of Staff Privileges to Physicians May Be Challenged under
Title VII or the ADA, 34 Ariz Atty 24,25 (Apr 1998). Employment relationships in the health
care industry have changed as health care services have shifted to managed care. Managed care
organizations, particularly HMOs, have increased dramatically in the United States as a result of
skyrocketing costs of medical care. HMO enrollees doubled from 1981 to 1985. By 1988, enroll-
ment was approximately thirty-three million; by 1998 it was eighty million. See Walter A. Zelman
and Robert A. Berensen, The Managed Care Blues and How to Cure Them 53,55 (Georgetown
1998) (citation omitted). This shift has resulted in many salaried physicians who are considered
to be employees rather than independent contractors. See Note, The Impact of Managed Care on
Doctors Who Serve Poor and Minority Patients, 108 Harv L Rev 1625,1631 (1995) (citation omit-
ted). Approximately one-half of the nation's physicians are in salaried positions in hospitals and
HMOs, while the other half are independent contractors. See Nation in Brief, The Atlanta Const
A10 (Mar 2, 1999). An estimated 80 percent of medical school graduates over the last five years
have taken salaried jobs and are employees. See Glenn Burkins, Health-Care Union to Organize
Doctors in Drive Aimed at Industry Power Shift, Wall St J A6 (Mar 2,1999). These "employee"
doctors are protected under Title VII. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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where it is based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes, which
are prohibited under EEOC guidelines.
Part I of this Comment focuses on the case law dealing with the
privacy BFOQ and argues that Johnson Controls restricts the permis-
sibility of the privacy BFOQ. Because of this, courts should apply a
higher burden to employers seeking to establish a privacy BFOQ. This
Part also shows that the privacy BFOQ case law is inconsistent with
the EEOC's longstanding interpretation of Title VII.
Part II sets forth a proposal to aid courts in narrowing the appli-
cation of the privacy BFOQ. Specifically, courts should apply two rules
when determining if sex is a privacy BFOQ. First, sex is not a privacy
BFOQ where an employer permits employees of one sex (for exam-
ple, female nurses) to treat patients of the opposite sex (male patients)
but does not permit employees of the other sex (male nurses) to treat
patients of the opposite sex (female patients). Second, where an em-
ployer permits physicians of both sexes to intimately treat patients of
the opposite sex, but does not permit nurses of both sexes to inti-
mately treat patients of the opposite sex, a privacy BFOQ is not avail-
able.
These rules will aid courts in narrowing the privacy BFOQ by
getting at whether privacy is, in addition to health care, the essence of
a particular business. In addition to providing a way for courts to nar-
row the privacy BFOQ consistent with Johnson Controls, these rules
gain legitimacy because they conform to the EEOC guidelines and en-
sure that the privacy BFOQ does not perpetuate sex stereotypes. Be-
fore setting forth the details of this proposal, Part II.A observes that
limiting the privacy BFOQ may infringe upon patients' privacy inter-
ests and will force them to adapt to new health care conditions. Such a
change in notions of privacy is not unprecedented. To support the vi-
ability of a proposal that depends upon, or results in, the mutability of
privacy interests, this Part presents historical evidence to illustrate that
such privacy interests are mutable. While there may be a period of
adjustment, this evidence shows that notions of privacy can and do
change.
I. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVACY BASED BFOQ
Under current case law, sex constitutes a BFOQ based on privacy
in a variety of situations.'8 Courts have permitted hospitals, nursing
homes, home health care agencies, and other employers such as
cleaning agencies to maintain discriminatory hiring policies for nurses,
18 This is in spite of the fact that some courts have held that the BFOQ defense was in-
tended to be very narrow. See text accompanying notes 6-12, which describes the privacy BFOQ.
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nurses' aides, and cleaning staff based on the privacy interests of third
• 19
parties.
Typically, courts apply the "essence of the business" test to de-
termine whether sex is a BFOQ for a particular occupation.2 0 When
courts have interpreted this test in cases involving the privacy BFOQ,
they have generally required an employer to show two things. First,
the employer must show that there is a factual basis for believing that
hiring one sex would undermine the essence of the employer's busi-
ness. Second, the employer must show that no reasonable alternative
or accommodation exists that could avoid or mitigate the conflict be-
tween equal employment opportunities and privacy interests.
21
Courts have interpreted the first prong loosely in privacy BFOQ
cases and have often found it satisfied if the employer shows that the
clients or guests of a particular business would not consent to service
by a member of the opposite sex and that the clients or guests would
stop patronizing the business if members of the opposite sex were al-
lowed to perform the service.2 For example, evidence presented by
one employer to establish a privacy BFOQ included speculative tes-
timony by a doctor that one-half of her patients would object to
treatment by a male nurse, and more than one-half of their husbands
would object.f The doctor also testified that she would object to
treatment by a male nurse.24 This prong can be satisfied even where
both sexes are physically capable of performing all necessary job du-
ties.2' The second prong of this test serves to ensure that no feasible
reconciliation can be achieved between the general nondiscrimination
principle of Title VII and the privacy rights of customers, clients, or pa-
tients.6 After describing the central cases involving the privacy BFOQ,
19 See notes 6-11.
20 This test was developed in Diaz v Pan American World Airways Inc, 442 F2d 385, 388
(5th Cir 1971), and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321,333
(1977), and Johnson Controls, 499 US at 203.
21 See Hardin v Stynchcomb, 691 F2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir 1982) (describing an em-
ployer's obligation to eliminate the clash between privacy and non-discrimination by reassign-
ment if possible); Gunther v Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir 1980)
(emphasizing that the employer must show a factual basis and the impracticality of reassigning
jobs); Fesel v Masonic Home ofDelaware Inc, 447 F Supp 1346,1351 (D Del 1978), affd, 591 F2d
1334 (3d Cir 1979) (considering whether selective job assignment would remedy privacy con-
cerns).
22 See EEOC v Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) 159,162 (W D Okla 1982) (de-
scribing customer preferences as particularly important in the privacy context); Fesel, 447 F Supp
at 1352-53 (giving the guests' privacy interests great weight).
23 See Backus v Baptist Medical Center, 510 F Supp 1191,1196 (E D Ark 1981).
24 Id.
25 See Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1350.
26 Consider id at 1351 (noting that courts will tolerate only a "minimal" infringement on
customers' privacy interests).
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this Part will explain why the courts' application of the BFOQ in
those cases seems inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent.
A. Case Law Surrounding the Privacy BFOQ
Four cases demonstrate that courts will allow sex discriminatory
policies in hiring nurses and nurses' aides: Fesel v Masonic Home of
Delaware, Incn Jones v Hinds General Hospital,2 Backus v Baptist
Medical Centern and EEOC v Mercy Health Center.3° Fesel and Jones
both involved residential retirement homes that refused to hire nurs-
ing aides of one sex to treat patients of the opposite sex. In Fesel, the
retirement home would not hire male aides because they would have
to perform intimate duties such as dressing and bathing patients, in-
serting catheters, and changing geriatric pads for female patients. The
nursing home believed this would violate the privacy interests of fe-
male residents. In Jones, the nursing home laid off eleven female
nursing aides, including the plaintiff, while retaining several male or-
derlies with less seniority. The orderlies performed essentially the
same duties as the nursing assistants, including bathing patients and
administering enemas.33
Both the Jones court and the Fesel court found that the defen-
dants had a factual basis for believing that hiring nurses of both sexes
would undermine the essence of their businesses.3 Masonic Home, the
defendant in Fesel, showed this through the testimony of several wit-
nesses, who opined that women would object to intimate touching by
males. Masonic also presented an affidavit signed by nine of the
twenty-two female residents of Masonic Home, noting that they ob-
jected to the employment of male nurses and might leave the nursing
home if this occurred.33 The defendant in Jones met its burden of es-
tablishing. that male sex was a BFOQ for orderlies by presenting tes-
timony from a hospital administrator, a urologist employed at the
hospital, and nurses. These testimonies indicated that some male pa-
tients objected to being exposed to female nursing assistants.-
27 447 F Supp 1346 (D Del 1978), affd,591 F2d 1334 (3d Cir 1979).
2 666 F Supp 933 (S D Miss 1987).
29 510 F Supp 1191 (E D Ark 1981), vacated on other grounds, 671 F2d 1100,1102-03 (8th
Cir 1982).
30 29 FEP Cases (BNA) 159 (W D Okla 1982) (finding that female gender is a BFOQ for
the position of staff nurse in the labor and delivery area of a health care facility, where duties of
these nurses include intimate ones).
31 See Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1348-52.
32 See Jones" 666 F Supp at 934.
33 See id.
34 See id at 936; Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1352-53.
35 See Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1352-53..
36 See Jones, 666 F Supp at 936.
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With regard to the second prong of the "essence of the business"
test, both the Fesel court and the Jones court found that there were no
reasonable alternative practices or accommodations with a less dis-
criminatory impact.3 In Jones, at the time of the layoff, the defendant
had four full-time orderlies and three who were used on an as-needed
basis. The full-time orderlies worked seven twelve-hour shifts in four-
teen days, and there was one available in the hospital at all times to
help out where needed." The court determined that this schedule re-
quired a minimum of four full-time male orderlies.' At the time the
plaintiffs were laid off, the hospital had two male nursing assistants,
and two or three male nurses. However, the male nurses were assigned
to specific units, and it was "impractical" for them to be available
throughout the hospital. Thus, the court concluded that the only rea-
sonable way the defendant could accommodate privacy interests of
male patients was to retain the male orderlies.'
Backus and Mercy Health both involved medical facilities that
hired only female nurses to work in the labor and delivery units. Both
courts found that these policies were permissible because female sex
was a BFOQ for nurses who worked in the labor and delivery units of
the health center. In Backus, Baptist Medical Center ("Baptist") re-
fused to permit males to work in the OB-GYN unit of the hospital
"because of the concern of our female patients for privacy and per-
sonal dignity which make[s] it impossible for a male employee to per-
form the duties of this position effectively.' A nurse's duties re-
quired, in addition to many non-intimate duties, substantial contact
with the mother's genitalia." The center in Mercy Health contended
that female sex was a BFOQ for these positions based upon "its belief
in the patient's right to privacy and upon the medical necessity of
minimizing the tension, fear, and stress which accompany the labor
and delivery experience."4 3
The court permitted the privacy BFOQ in Backus. It found that
the evidence presented by the defendant, which consisted primarily of
testimony by hospital staff, established that Baptist had a factual basis
for believing that female patients would object to intimate touching
by male nurses, and that male nurse care would undermine the hospi-
tal's business." Similarly, the Mercy Health court agreed that, based on
37 See id at 936-37; Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1353.
38 See Jones, 666 F Supp at 936-37.
39 See id at 937.
40 See id.
41 Backus, 510 F Supp at 1192.
42 See id at 1193.
43 Mercy Health, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) at 160-61.
44 See Backus,510 F Supp at 1195-96.
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evidence that 60 to 70 percent of the mothers and a larger percentage
of fathers objected to the use of male nurses in the labor unit, there
was "a factual basis for determining that the employment of male
nurses in the labor and delivery area would cause medically undesired
tension."45 However, Mercy Health had presented no additional evi-
dence that the presence of male nurses would undermine the essence
of the hospital's business.
In addition, the courts in Backus and Mercy Health both found
that no reasonable accommodation could be made to allow the em-
ployment of male nurses. The courts noted that "insurmountable
problems would occur" if the defendant had to permit male nurses to
work in the labor and delivery unit but was forced to reassign intimate
duties to female nurses.46 Also, because both hospitals had a "chaperon
policy," where a chaperon was normally present whenever a patient's
genital area was examined by someone of the opposite sex,47 accom-
modations were even more difficult because "a job that required only
one nurse will now require two, and this will cause a strain on the
nursing staff, increase the hospital's costs, and reduce the hospital's ef-
ficiency."4'
B. The Supreme Court's Construction of the BFOQ Defense
A recent Supreme Court case, International Union, UAW v John-
son Controls, Inc' casts doubt on the future of the privacy BFOQ. In
Johnson Controls, the Court confirmed that courts should use the "es-
sence of the business" test in determining whether sex is a BFOQ.5
However, the Court insisted on construing the "essence of the busi-
ness" test narrowly, which suggests that courts should develop a new
approach to determine whether sex is a privacy BFOQ.
Johnson Controls dealt with a BFOQ based on safety concerns
rather than privacy. The plaintiffs, a group of female employees, chal-
lenged Johnson Controls' policy of excluding fertile women from posi-
tions that involved exposure to lead. Johnson Controls, the employer,
defended its action by arguing that male sex was a BFOQ for these
positions because lead exposure can cause health problems, including
harm to fetuses."
45 Mercy Health, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) at 161,163. Some doctors also objected to the em-
ployment of male nurses in the labor unit. Id.
46 Backus, 510 F Supp at 1197.
47 See id; Mercy Health, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) at 161.
48 Backus,510 F Supp at 1198. See also Mercy Health,29 FEP Cases (BNA) at 161,163.
49 499 US 187 (1991).
50 See id at 203.
51 See id at 191-96.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis of the BFOQ exception by
noting that it was narrow.
The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it
narrowly. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-337
(1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-
125 (1985).... Our emphasis on the restrictive scope of the
BFOQ is grounded on both the language and the legislative
history of § 703.
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of re-
striction that indicate that the exception reaches only special
situations. The statute thus limits the situations in which discrimi-
nation is permissible to "certain instances" where sex discrimina-
tion is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of the
"particular" business.2
Next, the Court determined that the term "occupational" in the
BFOQ provision meant that the exception could not be invoked un-
less "job-related skills and aptitudes" were at issue.0 Finally, the Court
stressed that in order to qualify as a BFOQ, "a job qualification must
relate to the 'essence' . . . or to the 'central mission of the employer's
business."' ' ' The Court stated that this was the only logical interpreta-
tion of the "bona fide occupational qualification." "By modifying
'qualification' with 'occupational,' Congress narrowed the term to
qualifications that affect an employee's ability to do the job."
The Court then stated that "[o]ur case law, therefore, makes clear
that the safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or preg-
nancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the
job."' The Court determined that this approach was consistent with
the language of the BFOQ provision that permissible distinctions
based on sex must relate to the ability to perform the essential duties
of the job. Thus, the Court concluded that sex did not constitute a
BFOQ at Johnson Controls because being female in no way interfered
with an employee's ability to make batteries, which was the essence of
Johnson Controls' business. The Court emphatically rejected the em-
ployer's attempt to broadly construe the "essence" of its business": "It
52 Id at201.
53 Id.
54 Id at 203, citing Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321,333 (1977), and Western Air Lines Inc
v Crhsvell, 472 US 400,413 (1985) (emphasizing that a job qualification cannot be merely pe-
ripheral).
55 Johnson Controls, 499 US at 201.
56 Id at 204.
57 Id at 204-06.
58 The Court rejected the broad interpretation of the essence of the employer's business
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is word play to say that 'the job' at Johnson [Controls] is to make bat-
teries without risk to fetuses in the same way 'the job' at Western Air
Lines is to fly planes without crashing."' 9
Justice White pointed out in his concurrence in Johnson Controls
that the majority's interpretation of the BFOQ would disallow use of
privacy as a basis for a BFOQ:
The Court's interpretation of the BFOQ standard also would
seem to preclude considerations of privacy as a basis for sex-
based discrimination, since those considerations do not relate di-
rectly to an employee's physical ability to perform the duties of
the job. '
The majority responded to Justice White briefly and without ad-
dressing his concerns, as privacy interests were not at issue in Johnson
Controls. The Court stated that while it had never addressed privacy-
based sex discrimination, nothing in its discussion of the "essence of
the business" test suggested that sex could not be a BFOQ when pri-
61
vacy interests are implicated. Yet the Court did not explain how pri-
vacy interests could possibly constitute a BFOQ if the "essence" of a
particular business must be defined narrowly and includes only that
which is central to its mission.
Two conceivable interpretations follow from Johnson Controls.
The first is that the majority's interpretation of the "essence of the
business" eviscerates the privacy BFOQ, because the essence of any
that some circuit courts had adopted. See Torres v Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services, 859 F2d 1523,1529-30 (7th Cir 1988), where the essence of the business of a women's
prison included not just prison security, but also a rehabilitatiive environment free of any male
presence. In the Seventh Circuit opinion in Johnson Controls, the employer's "essence of the
business" was described as not just making batteries, but making batteries without adverse fetal
safety consequences. International Union, UAW v Johnson Contro4 Inc, 886 F2d 871,896 (7th Cir
1989).
59 Johnson Controls, 499 US at 207, quoting Johnson Contro4 886 F2d at 913 (Easterbrook
dissenting). This narrow construction of the essence of an employer's business was consistent
with earlier cases. For example, in the famous case of Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp
292 (N D Tex 1981), Wilson challenged Southwest's policy of hiring only female employees for
customer contact positions such as flight attendants and ticket agents. Southwest, calling itself
the "love airline" personified by feminine youth and vitality, asserted that its female-only per-
sonnel policy went to the essence of its unique, corporate persona. Id at 295-300. Southwest ar-
gued that transporting passengers with "love" was the essence of its business, and that the fe-
male-only hiring policy was crucial to its success. Id at 303-04. The court rejected Southwest's ar-
gument, and stated that the business essence requirement must be interpreted narrowly and spe-
cifically. In this regard, the court stated, "'Love' is the manner of job performance, not the job
performed." Id at 302. Thus, the court found that the essence of the business element of the
BFOQ test is satisfied only if a nondiscriminatory policy would preclude the successful perform-
ance of the employer's primary business mission, which in this instance was transporting passen-
gers. Id.
60 Johnson Controls, 499 US at 220 n 8 (White concurring).
61 See id at 206 n 4 (majority).
[67:749
The Privacy BFOQ
health car'e facility is to provide health care, irrespective of causing
tension or embarrassment. Or instead, Johnson Controls can be inter-
preted as requiring that courts interpret the privacy BFOQ more nar-
rowly, and permit it only where employers establish that protecting
patient privacy is central to the business-this may be shown, for ex-
ample, where an employer establishes that absent the BFOQ, he may
not be able to provide health care at all because he has lost all of his
customers.
C. Problems with the Privacy BFOQ
1. The impact of Johnson Controls on the privacy BFOQ.
The case law surrounding the privacy BFOQ is inconsistent with
the Court's narrow understanding of BFOQs in Johnson Controls.2
While Justice White was correct to point out that the Court's opinion
in Johnson Controls threatens the future of the privacy BFOQ, the
privacy BFOQ does survive. Johnson Controls requires, however, that
courts determine the essence of a particular business, and that the es-
sence must be defined narrowly. A health care provider must establish
that patient privacy goes to the essence of that particular business in
order for sex to constitute a privacy BFOQ.
Post-Johnson Controls defendants presenting claims similar to
those asserted in Fesel, Backus, Jones, and Mercy Health should not
prevail on a similar evidentiary showing. Evidence such as that pre-
sented in Fesel, Backus, Jones, and Mercy Health, indicating an em-
ployer's belief that some patients might not consent to treatment by a
member of the opposite sex, does not prove that the essence of a busi-
ness is to do anything other than provide health care; nor does it es-
tablish that the employer will not be able to provide health care at all
absent the BFOQ because it will have no patients. This is not suffi-
cient after Johnson Controls. Just as the Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's argument that the essence of its business was to make bat-
teries without risk to fetuses, and found instead that the essence of the
business was solely to make batteries, post-Johnson Controls courts
should find that the essence of the businesses in cases like Backus,
Jones, Mercy Health, and Fesel is to provide health care. Courts have
no basis for finding that a particular business's essence is more than
62 The four central privacy BFOQ cases concerning the health care industry are Fesel, 447
F Supp 1346; Jones, 666 F Supp 933; Backus, 510 F Supp 1191; Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP
Cases (BNA) 159.These cases are somewhat dated, and there are no recent privacy BFOQ cases
that are specific to the health care industry. Lack of litigation does not mean that few employers
are implementing sex discriminatory policies, however, and given that the courts in Fesel, Backus,
and Mercy Health were quick to side with the employer and permit a same-sex privacy BFOQ, it
is likely that some employees who are hurt by sex discriminatory employment policies decide
not to sue.
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that based upon evidence that, at the worst, some clients may leave if
treated by members of the opposite sex. Unfortunately, even where
post-Johnson Controls courts analyzing the privacy BFOQ have fo-
cused on whether the "essence" or "central mission" of a particular
business is to protect patients' or customers' privacy, they have not al-
ways interpreted the "essence" narrowly.6
2. The clash between the EEOC and the privacy BFOQ.
When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, it charged the EEOC
with administering, interpreting, implementing, and enforcing it. In
response, the EEOC issued guidelines in 1965 in order to aid courts.6
The EEOC does not oppose the BFOQ where "it is necessary for the
purpose of authenticity or genuineness ... e.g., an actor or actress."'
However, the guidelines forbid discrimination based on "assumptions
of the comparative employment characteristics of women," "stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes," and labels designating jobs as
"[m]en's jobs" and "[w]omen's jobs."6 Additionally, the guidelines
state explicitly that the BFOQ is not permitted where it is based on
certain kinds of customer preferences.s For example, airlines are not
permitted to hire only female flight attendants even if they believe
their customers "prefer" attractive stewardesses•
63 For example, in EEOC v Sedita, 816 F Supp 1291 (N D I1 1993), the district court va-
cated a partial summary judgment in favor of the EEOC. The EEOC had brought a Title VII ac-
tion against a women's health club to enjoin it from continuing its gender-based hiring policies.
Sedita, the president and sole shareholder of fifteen exclusively female health clubs named
Women's Workout World ("WWW"), implemented a female-only employment policy for all po-
sitions because these jobs involved substantial intimate physical contact with the members, in-
eluding exposure to nudity in showers, locker rooms, and exercise rooms. The defendant argued
that hiring men would violate club members' privacy interests. Id at 1293. In determining
whether female sex was a BFOQ based on privacy, the court looked to Mercy Health, Backus,
and Fesel, and then the court asked whether protecting privacy was the essence of the employer's
business. Id at 1296. It stated, "Although the EEOC makes a valid argument that the essence of
WWW is providing exercise classes, defendant's evidence allows a reasonable inference that the
'essence' of WWW can be more broadly construed as providing personal and individual service
to an exclusively female clientele." Id (emphasis added). In broadly construing the essence of
WWW's business, the court directly contradicted the approach Johnson Controls employed.
64 See 42 USC § 2000e-4(g) (1994). See also Wilson v Southwest Airlines, 517 F Supp 292,
298-99 (1981) (noting that the EEOC has historically interpreted the BFOQ defense narrowly);
Mercy Health, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) at 162 (recognizing that the EEOC's interpretation of
BFOQ should be given substantial weight but interpreting the BFOQ broadly).
65 See 29 CFR § 1604.2 (1965).
66 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(2).
67 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(1).
68 See 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (stating that the EEOC will not find a BFOQ exception
to satisfy the "preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers").
69 See Wilson, 517 F Supp at 298 (citing EEOC guidelines and refusing to allow customer
preferences to establish a BFOQ).
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The EEOC has issued guidelines interpreting various provisions
of Title VII, and while some have received deference, others have
not.0 In General Electric Co v Gilbert, ? the Supreme Court set forth a
test for determining how much deference courts should give to par-
ticular guidelines promulgated by the EEOC. Quoting an earlier case,
the Court wrote:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the[EEOC] under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control.7
In applying this test in Gilbert, the Court found that the decisive
factors as to whether a court should defer to a particular EEOC
guideline were: (1) whether the particular EEOC guideline at issue
was a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII or was promul-
gated significantly after Title VII was enacted; and (2) whether the
guideline was consistent with, or instead directly contradicted, an ear-
lier position taken by the EEOC at a date closer to the date of enact-
ment."
Application of these factors led the Gilbert court to hold that the
guideline at issue did not deserve deference because it had not been
issued contemporaneously to Title VII and had contradicted a previ-
ous position taken by the EEOC.74 However, these factors lead to the
opposite result with respect to the EEOC guidelines on the BFOQ
and any proposal to narrow the construction of the privacy BFOQ
70 The EEOC's published position is that a BFOQ cannot be based on customer prefer-
ences and stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. The EEOC did, in one Commission deci-
sion, state that an employer can establish a BFOQ based on privacy if he proves that he had a
factual basis for believing that hiring any members of one sex would directly undermine the es-
sence of the business, and that he could not assign job responsibilities selectively in such a way
that there would be minimal clash between the interests of the customers and the non-
discrimination principle of Title VII. See EEOC Dee No 82-4,1982 WL 21177, *2 (1982). The
Commission held that this showing had not been satisfied, however, so no privacy BFOQ was
permitted. Thus, the Commission did not need to consider whether the BFOQ would have been
based on customer preferences or stereotyped characterizations of the sexes; even if it had, the
Commission could have concluded that the BFOQ was not based on stereotypes or customer
preferences. Thus, this decision is not inconsistent with the EEOC's published position regarding
the BFOQ.
71 429 US 125 (1976).
72 Id at 141-42, quoting Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134,140 (1944).
73 See Gilbert, 429 US at 142.
74 See id at 142-43.
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should conform to this guideline. Unlike the guideline in Gilbert, the
EEOC's guideline regarding BFOQs was promulgated in 1965, almost
simultaneously with Title VII. Furthermore, the EEOC's position with
respect to the scope of the BFOQ has been consistent for thirty-five
75
years.
While courts interpreting the BFOQ generally have paid defer-
ence to these guidelines,' 6 courts applying the privacy BFOQ have not.
As Part II.C explains in greater detail, courts permit the privacy
BFOQ where it is based on "stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes," and permit discrimination based on labels of "men's jobs" and
"women's jobs." This is evident where courts permit sex-
discriminatory policies with respect to one sex and not the other. It is
possible, however, for employers to cater to their customers' privacy
interests without violating the EEOC guidelines-that is, without per-
petuating stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. The next Part will
explain how.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR COURTS
This Part sets forth a proposal that, if adopted by courts, would
narrow the application of the privacy BFOQ in a manner that is both
consistent with Johnson Controls and is appropriately deferential to
the EEOC guidelines. The current practice of loosely applying the es-
sence of the business test is questionable after Johnson Controls. In-
stead, courts should apply two rules that will rein in the privacy
BFOQ.
The first rule is that if an employer has an asymmetric sex-
discriminatory policy-one that applies to one sex but not the other-
then sex is not a privacy BFOQ. This rule follows from the conclusion
that asymmetric sex-discrimination is impermissibly based upon sex
stereotypes and customer preferences. The second rule is that if an
employer has a sex-discriminatory policy with respect to nurses or
nursing aides but not to doctors, then sex is not a privacy BFOQ. This
rule follows from the conclusion that such a policy is impermissibly
based upon sex stereotypes.
75 See Wilson, 517 F Supp at 298 (stating that the EEOC has "steadfastly adhered to its po-
sition that customer preference gives rise to a bona fide occupational qualification for sex ...
only '[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness'), quoting 29 CFR
§ 1604.2(a)(2).
76 See Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 334 (1977) ("We are persuaded-by the restric-
tive language of § 703(e), the relevant legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-that the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be
an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.")
(internal citations omitted). See also Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385,389
(5th Cir 1971) (stating that the EEOC's rejection of customer preference in the BFOQ provision
is entitled to "great deference").
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These rules have two virtues. First, they are consistent with John-
son Controls, in that they narrow the application of the privacy
BFOQ. They do so by helping courts determine whether the essence
of the defendant's business actually includes privacy. Second, they pay
due deference to the EEOC guidelines because they do not perpetu-
ate sex stereotypes. This proposal will limit the availability of the pri-
vacy BFOQ and, in doing so, will strain existing norms of privacy and
conceptions of appropriate gender roles. Such a shift might have costs,
given that a violation of a person's deeply-felt privacy interest might
cause real pain. But there will be a benefit as well-less sex discrimi-
nation. Thus, before explaining the proposal in greater detail, this Part
presents historical evidence to support the notion that privacy inter-
ests and conceptions of appropriate gender roles can change and have
changed, despite the costs.
A. The Desexualization of the Medical Profession
If there is such a strong privacy interest in having a female nurse
in the delivery room, why do so many patients accept a male obstetri-
cian delivering the baby? The obvious answer is that women do not
think of obstetricians in the same way. But this was not always the
case. An examination of the history of obstetrics in America reveals
how mutable feelings of privacy can be. Despite a long period of his-
tory where the sexual connotations of childbirth presented consider-
able barriers to male doctors assisting in childbirth, by the mid-
nineteenth century a coalition of physicians and lawmakers were suc-
cessful in persuading women to accept what they at first believed to
be deeply-felt violations of their privacy." This coalition was so suc-
cessful that today the "social organization of modem obstetrical care
denies or hides the sexual implications of childbirth, and thus mini-
mizes or eliminates role conflict for the male physician. ' ' However,
before male obstetricians could replace the female midwife, "men had
to be defined as socially acceptable persons to attend childbirth."'
For centuries women attended to other women during the birth-
ing process because women could not accept men witnessing this in-
timate female event." This embarrassment extended beyond women
77 Dara Clapper Brack, Displaced- The Midwife by the Male Physician, in Ruth Hubbard,
Mary Sue Henifin, and Barbara Fried, eds, Women Look at Biology Looking at Women 83, 87
(Schenkman 1979).
78 Id at 86-87.
79 Id at 83.
80 It was this unwillingness to sacrifice modesty that actually helped some women gain en-
trance into the medical field. Many women's beliefs that "the room of confinement is properly
woman's place" facilitated the entrance of female obstetricians. Judith Walzer Leavitt, Brought
to Bed: Childbearing in America 1750-1950 111 (Oxford 1986). "[W]hen women physicians be-
gan to be available, their services were sought by women from all economic and cultural back-
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to professors and students of obstetrics.8' Students generally received
only a theoretical education about the women they would be treating
and did not actually observe women in labor during their schooling.2
Samuel D. Gross, a student who observed Thomas Chalkley
James teaching obstetrics at the University of Pennsylvania early
in the nineteenth century, noticed that "it was seldom that he
raised his eyes from his manuscript, or looked squarely at his
audience. His cheeks would be mantled with blushes while en-
gaging in demonstrating some pelvic viscus .... It was often pain-
ful to witness his embarrassment. ',u
William Potts Dewees, teacher of obstetrics and author of the in-
fluential text, A Compendious System of Midwifery,u remained horri-
fied by the idea of visual inspection of women's genitals. "Using mani-
kins [sic], he taught his students how to perform unsighted digital ex-
plorations of parturient women .... [S]tudents learned to examine
women's genital tracts without looking at what they were doing.""'
Dewees urged that the patient's body should not be exposed, and that
the attendant should be able to perform without the aid of sight.6 An
obstetric student at Harvard recounted that practical obstetrics was
limited: "A female pelvis was placed on the table. The head of a rag
baby was thrust into it. It was our duty to ascertain the presentations,
and to deliver with forceps. ' '
While the association between childbirth and sexuality initially
presented a barrier to the entrance of male physicians into obstetrics,
physicians eventually forced female midwives out of the profession
they had once dominated. The probable reason for this is a combina-
tion of factors, including doctors' realization that substantial economic
gains could be achieved if they eliminated the midwife competitors,n
as well as the fear that "the obstetrician would never receive due rec-
ognition in the 'overcrowded' medical profession as long as women,
grounds. Some native-born upper-class women in the middle of the nineteenth century went to
extreme lengths to procure the services of women." Id at 113-14.
81 Id at 115. "When male medicine [eventually] entered the birthing rooms of America in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it entered on tiptoe." Id.
82 See id at 40.
83 Id.
84 William Potts Dewees, A Compendious System of Midwifery (Lea & Blanchard 10th ed
1843).
85 Leavitt, Brought to Bed at 41 (cited in note 80).
86 See id.
87 Id at 41-42.
88 See Judy Barrett Litoff American Midwives: 1860 to the Present 48 (Greenwood 1978)
("Doctors maintained that overcrowding had resulted in a loss of their status and a diminution
of their income. Not surprisingly, they began to devise plans for the purpose of limiting the num-
ber of medical practitioners.").
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untrained in the medical sciences, continued to serve as birth atten-
dants."'
This was not an overnight process, and male physicians had to
challenge prevailing norms regarding privacy. The desexualization
occurred in part because physicians were able to manipulate the legal
system. For example, doctors "call[ed] for the elimination of the mid-
wife on the grounds that she posed an economic threat to the medical
profession."9' In response, some states, such as Massachusetts, abol-
ished midwives entirely."' Others implemented programs that required
the licensing, regulation, supervision, and examination of the qualifica-
tions of midwives in order to control their expansion and their institu-
tionalization. 3 Additionally, several states required that the midwife
be a graduate of a "recognized" school, yet there were no state-
sponsored schools for midwives." Some states even enacted laws pre-
venting midwives from using any drugs, including silver nitrate, which
was commonly used to treat babies' eyes to prevent blindness. "[T]he
midwife had the choice of breaking the law or leaving the baby's eyes
to chance."9' All of these programs were designed to result in the ulti-
mate elimination of midwives.
By the 1960s, almost 99 percent of American babies were deliv-
ered by physicians, more than 93 percent of whom were male.9 7 Male
physicians had succeeded in desexualizing childbirth, but there were
costs to this desexualization. One was lower-quality health care. Male
physicians gained access to delivery rooms because women believed
that physicians, who brought with them into the practice anesthesia,
morphine, and forceps, also brought increased safety. In fact, male doc-
tors used techniques that were much more dangerous than those used
by midwives."' The safety record of male obstetricians in the nine-
teenth century, as measured by mortality statistics, "matched or was
worse than the record of midwives, who continued to follow a basi-
89 Id at 64.
90 See Brack, Displaced at 87 (cited in note 77).
91 Litoft American Midwives at 73 (cited in note 88).
92 See id at 79.
93 See id at 79-80. Still other states replaced midwives by establishing maternity dispensa-
ries and hospitals. Dispensaries aided women who delivered children in their own homes, while
the hospitals provided care for those who could not secure proper care at home. See id at 73-74.
94 See id at 99.
95 Id at 101.
96 See id at 80-82.
97 See Brack, Displaced at 83 & n 2 (cited in note 77).
98 See Frances E. Kobrin, The American Midwife Controversy: A Crisis of Professionaliza-
tion, in Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald L. Numbers eds, Sickness and Health in America:
Readings in the History of Medicine and Public Health 217,218 (Wisconsin 1978).
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cally noninterventionist birth policy"' ' and. a medical study reported
that in 1912, doctors lost more patients than midwives.O'
Another cost of desexualizing childbirth was the rise of the first
anti-abortion movement in the United States, which was directly
linked to the domination of obstetrics by male doctors and resulted in
the regulation of female bodies by men."' This anti-abortion move-
ment promoted a hierarchical vision of the relationship between men
and women and contributed to the patriarchal culture generally; '0 it
subordinated a woman's ability to control her body to laws that came
into being as a result of male physicians. Similar to the costs incurred
by women as a result of lower-quality health care, women generally
have suffered consequences as a result of their subordination to
men. Society bore these substantial costs so that men could become
gynecologists and obstetricians.
In desexualizing the field of obstetrics, both men and women
overcame, to a great extent, their embarrassment about intimacy. Men
did this because they wanted access to a profession from which they
had been excluded. Women did this because they wanted (and mistak-
enly thought they were getting) better health care. As a result, the cul-
tural perception that it was improper for men to be involved in child-
birth was shattered.
It may be true that women would not have been willing to bear
the burden of sacrificing their privacy for anything other than the
supposed benefits of improved health and safety to themselves and
their future children. Women may be less willing today, consciously or
unconsciously, to bear a similar burden of privacy infringement for the
sole benefit of alleviating sex discrimination in the workplace. The
purpose of this historical information, however, is to illustrate that no-
tions of privacy can change, and will if the benefit received is deemed
sufficiently worthy.
The next Part sets forth two rules that courts should adopt, in or-
der to narrow the construction of the privacy BFOQ in conformity
with Johnson Controls. In light of this historical evidence that privacy
norms are adaptable, this proposal is viable.
99 Leavitt, Brought to Bed at 56 (cited in note 80).
100 See id.
101 See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regu-
lation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan L Rev 261,280-319 (1992).
102 See id.
103 Reva Siegel argues that history demonstrates that "claims about women's bodies can in
fact express judgmefits about women's roles... Physicians regularly depicted abortion as an act
of feminine role resistance, encouraged by feminist advocacy. In so doing, they invested abortion
with symbolic meaning, urging Americans to oppose abortion in order to defend gender roles in
diverse spheres of social life." Id at 281.
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B. The First Rule: Asymmetric Policies Are Impermissible
The first rule is that if an employer has an asymmetric sex-
discriminatory policy, then sex is not a BFOQ based on privacy. For
example, an employment policy that permits female nurses to provide
intimate care for male patients but does not permit male nurses to
provide intimate care for female patients is asymmetric and should
not be allowed-for how can privacy be at the essence of the business
if the privacy interests of male patients are not being protected? Al-
though asymmetric policies are often justified as an attempt to protect
patients' privacy rights, generally these policies cater to stereotypes
about the appropriate roles for men and women. For instance, an
asymmetric policy might be grounded in anachronistic ideas about the
need for women to be sexually modest, or that nursing is a job for
women. Title VII and the EEOC guidelines are intended to combat
discriminatory policies based on sex stereotypes."5 There is no reason
that employment policies should be asymmetrical given the fact that,
as historical evidence supports, norms surrounding privacy and
"proper" gender roles can change if there is a greater good to be
achieved.
This stereotyping is reflected in the major cases that have allowed
privacy BFOQs in the health care industry.' For instance, the nursing
home in Fesel implemented its asymmetric policy because it believed
that women were concerned about exposing their naked bodies to
men, while men were not concerned about exposing their naked bod-
ies to women. The nursing home made generalized arguments based
on the attitudes of a few women. The home did not make the same
generalization about male patients, although one or two male patients
must have preferred treatment by men. The Fesel court acknowledged
that the female-only policy perpetuated stereotypes: "[T]he attitudes
of the nonconsenting female guests at the Home are undoubtedly at-
104 Note that I do not intend for this argument to apply in situations where privacy in con-
junction with another factor, such as rehabilitation or fear of violence, may establish a BFOQ.
For example, I am not arguing that women's rape shelters should not be permitted to invoke the
BFOQ exception in order to hire female therapists to aid female victims of rape. In this situa-
tion, there may be privacy interests at stake, but more importantly, there are issues of safety and
rehabilitation which may justify a same-sex BFOQ.
105 See Sprogis v United Air Lines; nc, 444 F2d 1194,1198 (7th Cir 1971) (stating that Sec-
tion 703(a)(1) of Title VII was "intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes"); Ridinger v General Motors Corp, 325 F
Supp 1089, 1096 (S D Ohio 1971) (stating that in enacting the Title VII prohibition against dis-
crimination on account of sex, Congress intended to prevent employers from refusing to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of his or her sex), revd on other grounds, 474
F2d 949 (6th Cir 1972). See also EEOC Dec No 77-36,1977 WL 5351, *3-4 (1977) (citing Sprogis
for the proposition that Congress intended Title VII to strike at disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes).
106 See Part I.A.
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tributable to their upbringing and to sexual stereotyping of the past. '' 7
By its own words, the Fesel court disregarded the EEOC's clear state-
ment that the BFOQ defense does not apply where it is based on
"stereotyped characterizations of the sexes."'' 9
Asymmetric policies also perpetuate the stereotype that nursing
is a womdn's job. For the past century nursing has been dominated by
women, who are portrayed in society as nurturers and care-givers. 10
Male entry into the nursing profession during the twentieth century
has been slow. In fact, in 1996 men represented only 5.4 percent of to-
tal employed nurses. 0 During wartime, women provided medical care
to injured soldiers since there were very few men available to perform
these services. Men, by necessity, were forced to receive intimate care
by women. Women are not accustomed to receiving male nursing care
because, as the statistics show, they generally have not received this
care. Nurses' jobs are generally thought to be "women's jobs" rather
than "men's jobs." The EEOC specifically stated that the BFOQ
should be limited in these situations: "The commission believes that
the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be
interpreted narrowly. Label[s]-'Men's jobs' and 'Women's jobs'-
tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or
the other.11.
In fact, a recent study provides support for the argument that
people's notions of privacy are based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes.112 This study was conducted in order to identify if there
was any relationship between the intimacy of a nursing interaction
and the patient's level of embarrassment. The study consisted of com-
pleted questionnaires from ninety-eight gynecological patients who
received intimate care from nurses. It found that in a population of pa-
tients who have no prior experience of hospital admission, or of being
cared for by a male nurse, there is a preference for care by a female
nurse. However, this preference is not demonstrated in patients who
107 Fesel, 447 F Supp at 1352.
108 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii).
109 See Henry Etzkowitz, The Male Sister: Sexual Separation of Labor in Society, 33 J Mar-
riage & Fam 431,432 (1971) ("The role of nurse has been accepted as being especially congruent
with the traditional role of the female in western culture."); Christine Neylon O'Brien and
Margo E.K. Reder, Comment, Modeling an Employment Policy to Unify Workers' Rights with
Fetal Protection, 24 Ariz St L J 1149, 1176 n 143 (1992) (referring to nursing as a "traditionally
female occupation").
110 See Survey of RNs Shows Strong Opportunities in Nursing, 30 The American Nurse 1
(Jan/Feb 1998), available online at <http:llwww.nursingworld.orgltan/98janfeb/survey.htm> (vis-
ited Apr 17,2000).
111 29 CFR § 1604.2(a) (emphasis added).
112 See Nicholas N. Lodge, et al,A Study to Ascertain Gynecological Patients' Perceived Lev-
els of Embarrassment with Physical and Psychological Care Given by Female and Male Nurses, 25
J Advanced Nursing 893 (1997).
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have undergone previous hospital admission within the last five years
or who have been cared for by a male nurse.
The authors concluded from their findings that the cultural pref-
erence among gynecological patients for care by a female nurse is
changed by experience during hospital admission. ' This study sup-
ports the argument that women generally prefer female rather than
male nurses, at least in part, because they have only been treated by
female nurses. In the views of these inexperienced patients, nurses
should be women. However, once they have received treatment by
male nurses, their stereotypes are shattered, and their preferences be-
gin to shift.
In addition to being grounded in stereotypes, asymmetric policies
undermine the logic of employers' and courts' argument that privacy
interests can be protected only by hiring employees who are the same
sex as the customers. For example, the residential retirement home in
Fesel refused to hire male nursing aides because their duties included
such things as bathing patients and inserting catheters. Male aides who
performed these duties allegedly would violate privacy rights of fe-
male residents.11 4 However, female aides must have attended to male
patients at the retirement home because more than 20 percent of the
residents were male, and all aides were female."5 The court did not
comment on this inconsistency and evidently was not troubled by the
asymmetric nature of the privacy BFOQ.
C. The Second Rule: If Male Doctors Can Treat Female Patients,
Then Male Nurses and Aides Can as Well
Courts should adopt a rule that an employer who has a sex-
discriminatory policy with respect to nurses or nursing aides but not
doctors may not successfully assert a privacy BFOQ. The duties of
nurses, aides, and doctors generally require a similar level of intimacy;
thus, there is little justification for treating them differently with re-
spect to jobs that involve intimate duties. ' The courts that have per-
mitted the privacy BFOQ in the health care context failed to ac-
knowledge that male doctors treat female patients in an intimate
manner every day. For example, in Backus, the court took little notice
of the fact that only two of the eleven obstetricians at the defendant's
113 See id.
114 See Fesel,447 F Supp at 1353.
115 See id at 1348.
116 Some might disagree with this statement; it is difficult to quantify the level of intimacy
involved in various jobs, particularly given the subjective nature of the inquiry. All of these occu-
pations clearly require some level of intimacy, and while it is possible for there to be slight varia-
tion among occupations, there is also variation within occupations. Regardless, small differences
in the level of intimacy should not dictate differential employment policies.
2000]
The University of Chicago Law Review
hospital were female.11 7 This fact undercuts the argument that patients'
privacy interests are violated by opposite-sex treatment.
Obstetricians, nurses, and nurses' aides have a similar degree of
intimacy with patients. A physician's examination of a vagina is no less
intimate than a nurse's." In fact, it should be more thorough. The
same is true with a nurse and doctor who are preparing a male patient
for a penile implant. Both doctors and nurses are trained to be gentle
in their examination, and empathic and understanding toward the pa-
tient."' Nurses' aides, similarly, must be gentle yet professional when
bathing patients. When gathering a patient's history, doctors and
nurses alike are taught to ask about such personal matters as sexual
history, pregnancy history, eating disorders, domestic abuse, and drug
addictions.'2 One manual instructs physicians that the purpose of the
initial interview is "to establish a trusting and supportive relationship
with the patient, and to offer information and counselling.... Provid-
ing emotional support not only enhances the gathering of information
but in itself is part of the therapeutic process of patient care."'2'
Furthermore, the health care setting can be structured so as to
minimize intimacy associated with the job. For example, the desexuali-
zation of fields like obstetricsn has been attributed to several factors,
including "[t]he removal of the woman from a familiar environment;
the emotional neutrality of the doctor-patient relationship; the rituals
of aseptic technique and surgical preparation; the routine use of medi-
cation and forceps; and finally, the routine use of anesthesia. ' Sev-
eral of these factors, particularly the first two, apply to nurses and
aides as well as doctors. Concerned employers can follow similar steps*
to desexualize the duties of any of their employees. In fact, courts may
require employers to take these steps to minimize intimacy as a rea-
sonable accommodation. The second prong of the essence of the busi-
ness test requires courts to determine that no reasonable accommoda-
tion can be made before allowing a privacy BFOQ, and the above
procedures are likely to be considered reasonable.
Of course, there are differences among the jobs of physicians,
nurses, and aides-some of which are real and some of which are per-
ceived. Real differences include level of education and income. An-
other difference is that physicians generally are capable of performing
117 See Backus, 510 F Supp at 1192.
118- See Lynn S. Bickley and Robert A. Hoekelman, Bates' Guide to Physical Examination
and History Taking 410-17 (Lippincott 7th ed 1999); Yondell Masten, The Obstetric Survival
Handbook 52-53 (Skidmore-Roth 1998).
119 See Bickley and Hoekelman, Bates' Guide at 410-11 (cited in note 118).
120 See id at 1-13; Masten, The Obstetric Survival Handbook at 21-47 (cited in note 118).
121 Bickley and Hoekelman, Bates' Guide at 1 (cited in note 118).
122 See Part II.A.
123 Brack, Displaced at 87 (cited in note 77).
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duties that the others are not, such as performing surgery or prescrib-
ing medication. Perceived differences, which may or may not be true,
largely stem from the real differences, and could include the following:
(1) nurses are less professional than doctors; (2) aides are more likely
than doctors to abuse patients' trust; (3) patients become closer, emo-
tionally, with their nurses than their doctors.
The notion that nurses infringe more on patients' privacy than
doctors seems to be motivated by the perceived differences between
the occupations rather than real ones. A claim of differential intrusion
cannot be due to real differences. A male nurse with two years of post-
high-school education and an annual income of $30,000 poses no
greater privacy intrusion upon a woman to whose genitalia he is ex-
posed during the course of work than a male doctor with eight years
of post-high-school education and a $200,000 annual income-income
is irrelevant to the level of intrusion. Also, physicians' ability to per-
form duties such as surgery or gynecological examinations would
make doctors intrude more, not less, on privacy, than nurses.
The perceived differences, upon which the claim of different lev-
els of intrusion rests, do not exist. First, there is no reason to presume
that nurses will perform their duties in a less professional manner than
doctors. Both have special training and expertise within the scope of
their duties, and both are subject to discipline for failure to perform
duties in an appropriate manner. Second, there is no reason to think
that nurses will be more likely to abuse their patients' trust than doc-
tors. If nurses are able to establish a greater degree of trust with pa-
tients than doctors, they may be better able to abuse that trust. But the
greater authority of doctors would actually allow physicians to more
easily take advantage of patients. In any case, there is little reason to
assume that nurses are more inclined to abuse patients' trust than doc-
tors.
Finally, there is no reason to think patients will become emotion-
ally closer to their nurses than their physicians, unless, perhaps, the
more frequent interaction with the nurse builds a relationship of trust
with the nurse. If this is true, however, the examinations by the trusted
nurse rather than the less familiar doctor should be less intrusive on
privacy due to the trust that has developed between patient and nurse.
D. Potential Costs Related to the Second Rule
1. Sexual abuse.
One might argue that same-sex treatment is necessary to prevent
sexual abuse of patients, but this argument is questionable as long as
male physicians are permitted to intimately treat female patients. The
incidence of sexual abuse by male physicians of female patients is sub-
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stantial.'2 This type of abuse has increased from 2.5 percent of all of-
fenses committed by doctors to 5 percent of all offenses between 1990
and 1995."' In fact, a recent study reported that four of ten doctors
disciplined for sex offenses nationwide still practice medicine.a De-
spite the evidence of abuse, men are not denied the opportunity to
practice as obstetricians or gynecologists.
Nor should men be denied jobs as nurses and aides, particularly
where employers can make reasonable accommodations to protect
against patient abuse. Employers who are concerned about the possi-
bility of sexual abuse of patients by nurses or aides can implement
chaperone policies, as some health facilities currently do for physi-
cians, suggesting that these accommodations are reasonable. Also, em-
ployers can require sexual awareness classes for nurses and aides. The
classes might emphasize that sexual (and non-sexual) abuse is not tol-
erated, and can suggest appropriate methods of performing intimate
tasks to avoid impropriety. Such classes can also inform employees of
the repercussions of committing abuse, which include termination and
criminal prosecution.
2. Extending the privacy BFOQ to physicians.
Employers could attempt to satisfy the second rule by extending
the privacy BFOQ to physicians.' This would eliminate the asymme-
try because doctors and nurses alike could not provide medical care
for members of the opposite sex. However, extending the privacy
BFOQ to physicians has troubling implications. As Part II.A illus-
124 The results of a medical study performed in Britain indicated that 8 percent of the
women sampled reported experiences where doctors had conducted a gynecological examina-
tion in a "less than professional manner." This involved overexposure of the woman's body, in-
appropriate comments and gestures, and being examined in an unusual position. The same study
also concluded that, of the lead physicians in genitourinary medicine clinics that were surveyed, 8
percent were aware of allegations of unprofessional behavior in their departments in the pre-
ceding five years. C.J. Bignell, Chaperones for Genital Examination, 319 BMJ No 7203 137,137-
38 (July 17, 1999). See also Deal Swifter, Stronger Punishment to Doctors Who Betray Trusted
Role, Ft Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel 10A (July 7, 1997) (stating that a report issued by Ralph
Nader's Public Citizen organization documents the cases of 542 doctors who were disciplined for
molestation of their patients).
125 See Leslie Nicholson, Research Reports, 13 Med Malpractice L & Strategy No 8,6 (June
1996).
126 This statistic was determined by a nationwide study conducted by Public Citizen in
Washington D.C. See Christine E. Dehlendorf and Sidney M. Wolfe, Physicians Disciplined for
Sex-Related Offenses (Public Citizen Health Research Group 1997). See also Deal Swifter,
Stronger Punishment, Ft Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel at 10A (cited in note 124).
127 See Michael R. Lowe, Stirring Muddled Waters: Are Physicians with Hospital Medical
Staff Privileges Considered to Be Employees Under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities
Act When Alleging an Employment Discrimination Claim, 13 Labor Law 225, 226-27 (1997)
(noting that hospitals have broad latitude to condition physicians' privileges and, in some cases
may not even be constrained by Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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trates, the medical profession has made great strides in desexualizing
the profession, especially in the fields of obstetrics and gynecology. It
was not until this desexualization began to occur that women first
agreed to receive intimate treatment by male doctors. Extending the
privacy BFOQ to male obstetricians and gynecologists would have the
perverse effect of resexualizing the profession. Additionally, endorsing
such an exception to Title VII would send a message that opposite-sex
treatment is inappropriate, and would perpetuate the sex stereotypes
that the EEOC guideline prohibits.
Extending the privacy BFOQ to doctors is also troubling because
it would hinder the employment opportunities of thousands of trained
physicians and might ultimately lead to the demise of the male obste-
trician and gynecologist.' Given this country's commitment to equal
employment, the privacy BFOQ should not be extended to physicians
absent a compelling justification.
3. Women's choice of doctor.
Health care providers may wish to hire only female gynecologists
and obstetricians, because demand for female doctors may exceed
supply. A woman's ability to choose the sex of her doctor may be lim-
ited if health care providers are not allowed to hire only female gyne-
cologists and obstetricians. Asymmetric employment policies would
therefore be justified as a way to compensate for the scarcity of fe-
male doctors. Two points can be said about this. First, a narrow con-
struction of the privacy BFOQ will have little net effect on patients'
abilities to choose the sex of their doctors. Patients in the managed
care system are currently limited in their ability to choose their doc-
tors' sex. Many managed care organizations provide patients with a
list from which they must choose their physicians, but physicians on
the list are often unavailable to take on new patients, leaving patients
with little choice as to who will become their doctor.'2
Second, patients should not be granted an inviolable right to
choose doctors on the basis of sex, since sex says little about a doctor's
128 See note 16, discussing the increasing preference by females for female obstetricians and
gynecologists, and the increasing supply of female obstetricians and gynecologists.
129 See Mindelle Jacobs, Female Docs in High Demand, Edmonton Sun 35 (July 29, 1999).
Jacobs describes how in Canada women are finding it difficult to see female doctors because less
than 20 percent of female doctors are accepting new patients. As a result, it takes women months
to find a female physician, and many end up seeing a male physician. Id. Anecdotal evidence
supports the conclusion that the same is true for women who seek to be treated by female physi-
cians in the United States In support of the proposition that patients increasingly have less
choice over their doctors, see Andy Miller, HMO Satisfaction Declines in Survey, Atlanta J &
Const D3 (Oct 20,1999) (stating that the biggest reason why patients in traditional health plans
are more satisfied with their health plan than those in HMOs is because of the ability of patients
in traditional plans to choose their doctor).
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qualifications' and selecting a doctor because of her sex perpetuates
privacy norms and invidious discrimination. Also, as Part II.E de-
scribes, to the extent that a doctor's sex is extremely important to
some patients, the market will respond to that demand in such a way
that the rules set forth above will be inapplicable, and thus will not
prevent a successful privacy BFOQ.
E. The Market's Response to Changes in Demand
This proposal, if applied by courts, will narrow the use of the pri-
vacy BFOQ. But courts will not be able to apply these two rules in
every instance where an employer asserts a privacy BFOQ. Imagine,
for instance, fifteen female physicians who decide to go into private
practice together and agree to open a women's health care facility
("Facility"). The Facility treats only women, and all of the participat-
ing physicians are female. Suppose then, that David responds to an
advertisement for a physician's assistant position at the Facility. He at-
tempts to fill out an application but is told that only women are con-
sidered for the position. In fact, every person on staff at the Facility is
female, and every patient is female.
David brings a Title VII claim against the Facility, alleging that
he was the victim of intentional discrimination because of his sex. The
Facility raises an affirmative defense. They assert that female sex is a
BFOQ for all positions at the Facility in order to protect the privacy
interests of the patients. A court presiding over this case could not ap-
ply either of the rules set forth above. The first rule does not apply be-
cause there are no male patients, so there can be no female physician's
assistants treating patients of the opposite sex. The second rule is not
applicable either, because there are no male physicians treating fe-
male patients. Thus, the rules in Parts II.B and II.C serve no use in this
instance.
This scenario illustrates that if courts adopt this proposal and
limit the use of the privacy BFOQ, there is still room for the market to
compensate for customer preferences. If there is a demand by women,
for example, for all-female medical treatment, the market will adjust
to provide this option, and it will not be prohibited from doing so by
either rule. Allowing a BFOQ at the Facility maintains the status quo
instead of challenging notions of privacy and permits the perpetuation
of sex stereotypes. But the rules set forth in this Comment do not ad-
dress this situation: they limit the application of the BFOQ only to
those situations where the rules can be applied-where there are male
130 While there is anecdotal evidence indicating that female OB-GYNs spend more time
with their patients than male OB-GYNs, there is no conclusive evidence that the female OB-
GYNs provide better-quality health care than male OB-GYNs.
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and female patients, and where there are physicians treating patients
of the opposite sex.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that a recent Supreme Court case, Interna-
tional Union, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc, requires courts that are
called upon to determine whether sex is a BFOQ based on privacy to
alter their analyses. Johnson Controls calls for a more restrictive inter-
pretation of the BFOQ and emphasizes the importance of ensuring
equal employment opportunities. Sex cannot be a BFOQ unless it is
necessary to the essence of the business. This is true even where an oc-
cupation demands exposure to intimate body parts. Given that more
and more doctors are becoming salaried employees subject to Title
VII, and given that there is an increasing preference among women to
be treated by female obstetricians and gynecologists, it is important
that courts properly take a narrow approach- to the "essence of the
business" test, as required by Johnson Controls. If they do not, obstet-
rics and gynecology might be re-sexualized, and many trained physi-
cians may have a difficult time obtaining salaried positions.
This Comment proposes two rules which must be satisfied in or-
der for a health care provider to demonstrate successfully that sex is a
privacy BFOQ. First, courts should not permit a privacy BFOQ where
nurses of one sex (for example, female) are allowed to treat patients
of the opposite sex (male) but nurses of the other sex (male) are not
allowed to treat patients of the opposite sex (female). Second, a
BFOQ for nurses or aides should not be permitted if the employer
permits physicians to engage in intimate opposite-sex treatment of pa-
tients. If either of these conditions is not satisfied, sex is not a privacy
BFOQ because presumptively, the essence of the particular business
does not include the protection of patients' privacy interests.
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